Everything a receipt references must be retrievable by hash for seven years (spec §8), and receipts are verified offline against these artifacts for as long as they exist (§6.4). So the shapes below are frozen from the first production write. A change is a new version (a new receipt_version, a new key prefix, a new content type), never an edit of an existing one.
1. Receipt schema: delegus-receipt-v1 #
The receipt is spec §6.2. The engine emits exactly these fields, in this order in the JSON body; the signed payload is the JCS of the body without receipt, so field order never affects verification.
| Field | Present | Notes |
|---|---|---|
receipt_version | always | "delegus-receipt-v1" |
receipt_id | always | drc_<ULID> |
decision, reason | always | reason is null on ALLOW, else a §5.2/§5.3 code |
evaluated_at | always | RFC 3339 UTC with milliseconds; the historical clock |
relying_party | always | RP DID |
principal, agent, grant_id, authority, expires_at | only once P3 passed (§6.4) | authority is the matching Capability, or null on DENY |
grant_hash, proof_hash | always | sha256:<hex> over the compact JWS strings as received |
request_hash | when the action canonicalizes | sha256:<hex> over UTF-8 of JCS(action) |
evidence.issuer_resolution | once the issuer lookup succeeded | did, did_document_hash, resolved_at |
evidence.status | once the revocation state was read | credential_url, credential_hash, valid_from (if the credential parsed), checked_at, status_list_index |
evidence.trust_config_version, evidence.trust_config_hash | always | |
protocol | always | result PASS/FAIL, profile delegus-base-v1, profile_hash, checks P1…P20 each true \| false \| "skipped" |
trust | always | result, policy_version delegus-trust-v1, checks T1, T2, T3, T5 |
receipt | always | non-detached compact JWS: alg EdDSA, typ delegus-receipt+jwt, kid did:web:<domain>#receipt-<n> |
Reason codes, check ids and the two result values are the enums in docs/ (ReasonCode, ProtocolCheckId, TrustCheckId); the engine's tests assert the document equals the code.
2. Evidence store (S3, Object Lock)#
| Bucket | one per environment (delegus-evidence-<env>-<account>, infra) |
| Object key | sha256/<64 lowercase hex>: the artifact's own hash, so retrieval is GET /evidence/sha256:<hex> and the key can never disagree with the content |
| Write | PutObject with If-None-Match: *; a 412 means the bytes are already there (same hash, same bytes) and counts as success. No ServerSideEncryption or SSEKMSKeyId headers; bucket default encryption applies. |
| Read | GetObject by key; served with the stored content type, Cache-Control: public, max-age=31536000, immutable, ETag = the hex hash |
| Delete | never issued by the API |
| Retention | Object Lock COMPLIANCE, 7 years, in production; GOVERNANCE, 1 day, in development (infra) |
Artifact kinds and their content types:
| Artifact | Hash in the receipt | Content type | Bytes |
|---|---|---|---|
| DID document snapshot | evidence.issuer_resolution.did_document_hash | application/did+json | the response body exactly as fetched (hosted) or exactly as generated (managed) |
| Status-list credential | evidence.status.credential_hash | application/vc+jwt | the compact JWS string, ASCII |
| Profile document | protocol.profile_hash | text/markdown; charset=utf-8 | docs/profiles/delegus-base-v1.md, 1836 bytes, sha256:23d4ace09635816acf058cf86f0db15dae3ea802fce4ab2e916df0412ac7aa4e |
| Trust-configuration descriptor | evidence.trust_config_hash | application/json | docs/trust-config/trust_0001.json, sha256:a075fa93bed9b85cf2697df1ea80f65c1d4b0ca00afcaab788d486e477cb1196 |
Grants, Proofs and Actions are not stored by Delegus; the receipt pins their hashes and the relying party keeps the bytes (§8 lists what Delegus retains). Receipts themselves are stored in Postgres (receipts) by receipt_id, with the full body and JWS; the JWS is the canonical receipt.
3. Status-list credential#
One Bitstring Status List (131,072 bits) per Principal, published at https:/ with Cache-:
- compact JWS,
algEdDSA,typvc+jwt,kiddid:web:<domain>#status-;<n> - payload
@context["https:/,/ www. w3. org/ ns/ credentials/ v2"] type["VerifiableCredential",,"BitstringStatusListCredential"] id= the published URL,issuer= the service DID,validFrom(backdated 60 s for clock skew),credentialSubject{ id: "<url>#list", type: "BitstringStatusList", statusPurpose: "revocation", encodedList }; encodedListisu+ base64url(GZIP(bitstring)), bit index most significant bit first; a Grant'sstatusListIndexis the bit number.
Every re-signed list (each revocation) is a new artifact in the evidence store; receipts pin the one that was evaluated.
4. Keys#
- Receipt keys
did:web:<domain>#receipt-, status keys<n> did:web:<domain>#status-, Ed25519 in KMS. Rotation adds<n> <n+1>and keeps<n>published (DELEGUS_); a key is never removed from the DID document while any receipt it signed is within retention.RECEIPT_ KEYS_ RETIRED - The service DID document is served by the API at
/(and, for the DID domain itself, at the same path on that host); the production copy is a static file the website publishes from the same outputs.. well- known/ did. json
5. Operational records (not receipt evidence, but shape-frozen)#
- Request log line:
{ time, level, msg: "request", request_plus, on verify,id, method, path (templated), host, status, duration_ ms } rp, principal, grant_. Never keys, Grants, Proofs or receipt bodies.id, receipt_ id, decision, reason, engine_ ms - Audit event:
{ event_; append-only.id: aud_ <ULID>, occurred_ at, actor { kind, did, key_ id }, action noun. verb, target, request_ id, details }
6. What changing any of this means#
A new receipt version (delegus-) with its own verifier in core; a new key prefix for any new artifact kind; a new profile or trust-config file with a new hash. Old receipts must keep verifying with the old shapes for their entire retention.