Why: the vendor is the one acting on the request, and it can't see your internal approvals.
A good answer: the agent carries a permission your company issued, and the vendor checks it before acting.
Why: an agent with broad access will eventually use it for something nobody intended.
A good answer: a written scope (which actions, which resources, which vendors) that's checked on every request, not just at setup.
Why: a card limit caps one card, but not invoices, credits, or orders spread across vendors.
A good answer: a limit enforced at the vendor for each action, plus a total you watch across all of them.
Why: permissions outlive the project they were written for.
A good answer: every permission has an expiry, and an expired one is refused, not quietly honored.
Why: shutting down a misbehaving agent shouldn't mean phoning each vendor or canceling a shared card.
A good answer: one revoke that every vendor's next check will see, and you've practiced it.
Why: "allow when unsure" turns an outage into an open door.
A good answer: the check fails closed (a deny or an error, never an allow), and the vendor's integration does the same.
Why: agent keys leak like any other secret.
A good answer: each request is bound to one vendor, one action and one moment, can't be replayed, and can't exceed the permission it came with.
Why: when a vendor or an auditor asks "who allowed this?", logs that only you can vouch for are your word against theirs.
A good answer: a signed record of each decision, kept for a stated period, that the other side can check for itself.
Why: invoices, net terms, data pulls and configuration changes never touch a card limit.
A good answer: the same authority check applies whatever the rail, or whether money moves at all.
Why: a record is only as trustworthy as the key that signed it.
A good answer: keys held in hardware, published so anyone can verify, and rotated without invalidating the records already signed.